<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347</id><updated>2008-05-23T09:52:03.675-04:00</updated><title type='text'>Minnesota Personal Injury and Class Action Lawsuit</title><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.php'/><link rel='next' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default?start-index=26&amp;max-results=25'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default'/><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>26</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-3472023289118346607</id><published>2008-05-23T09:48:00.001-04:00</published><updated>2008-05-23T09:49:58.984-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Personal Injury'/><title type='text'>Personal Injury</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The appellant was injured by a vehicle owned by the respondent. The appellant required a recurring surgery to alleviate chronic neck pain. The issue at hand was should future medical expenses be covered for the procedure in question. The respondents claimed that the procedure was experimental and unproven by scientific study. This was disproved by the appellants and the respondents were ordered to pay for future surgeries for the appellant. Lisa M. Sipe v. Fleigles Transportation and Services, Inc (Hennepin)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0805/opa070699-0513.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2008/05/personal-injury_23.html' title='Personal Injury'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/3472023289118346607'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/3472023289118346607'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-2906159901705874891</id><published>2008-05-23T09:47:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2008-05-23T09:48:25.052-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Statute of Limitations'/><title type='text'>Statute of Limitations</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Homeowner contracted a cleaning company to repair fire damage; the cleaners were faulty in the repair work and failed to clean a mold infestation. The homeowner discovered the mold in 1999 but filed suit in 2002. The two year statue of limitations had run its course. Knowledge of the injury not the actual injury causes the statute of limitations to begin. The court states that the appellant failed to act with due expedience in filing claim against the cleaning company. Kathleen Smith, et al. vs. Lindstrom Cleaning and Construction, Inc (Hennepin) &lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0805/opa071122-0513.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2008/05/statute-of-limitations_23.html' title='Statute of Limitations'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/2906159901705874891'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/2906159901705874891'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-8281086076640018842</id><published>2008-05-23T09:46:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2008-05-23T09:47:36.153-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Statue of Limitations'/><title type='text'>Statue of Limitations</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The appellant was struck by a snowplow owned by the respondents. The respondent’s insurer was declared insolvent and liquidated before a settlement could be reached. The appellant then filed for Uninsured Motorist claim against his own policy, who refused to pay. The primary issue at hand was the statute of limitations, does the statue begin when the insurance company was liquidated or does the statute apply to the original claim. The court ruled that the original claim initiated the statute, so the appellant’s claim of UM coverage was time barred. Sergey Oganov vs. American Family Insurance Group&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0805/opa070929-0513.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2008/05/statue-of-limitations.html' title='Statue of Limitations'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/8281086076640018842'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/8281086076640018842'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-1377303671724065484</id><published>2008-05-23T09:44:00.001-04:00</published><updated>2008-05-23T09:46:16.695-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Personal Injury'/><title type='text'>Personal Injury</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The appellant was shot and rendered a paraplegic by a security guard at an apartment complex. The appellant claimed that the apartment owners were also at fault along with the security guard. The court ruled that the apartment owners did not hold direct control over the duties and daily activities of the security guards, so the apartment owners are not liable for the appellant’s injuries. Hussein Musse, a minor, et al. vs. Timothy Engle, et al.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0805/opa070725-0513.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2008/05/personal-injury.html' title='Personal Injury'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/1377303671724065484'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/1377303671724065484'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-3787075239318342167</id><published>2008-05-23T09:41:00.001-04:00</published><updated>2008-05-23T09:43:16.183-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Statute of Limitations'/><title type='text'>Statute of Limitations</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The appellant filed suit against a subcontractor for shoddy work that resulted in the appellant getting sued by a homeowner. The respondent claims that MN statute 541.051 bars the appellant from filing suit after a 10 year statute of limitations has run its course. This case is unique that the legislature amended the statute in question, removing the 10 year limitation, thus opening the appellant to filing suit in appeals. The court ruled to reverse the original decision and rule in favor of the appellant. U.S. Home Corporation, b/b/a Lundgren Brothers vs. Zimmerman Stucco and Plaster, Inc. (Hennepin)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/www.mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/opa070889-0513.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2008/05/statute-of-limitations.html' title='Statute of Limitations'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/3787075239318342167'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/3787075239318342167'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-724709683953316967</id><published>2008-05-23T09:38:00.001-04:00</published><updated>2008-05-23T09:41:31.303-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Criminal Appeal'/><title type='text'>Criminal Appeal</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The Appellant was convicted of murder in 1999, he is appealing the summary denial of his petition for postconviction relief, this is affirmed by the court. Martin claims that his equal rights were infringed when the State struck the only African American juror, second the district court was abusive in its discretion by excluding the testimony of a defense witness. Finally the appellant claims that abused its discretion by denying the appellant a Schwartz hearing to discuss and evaluate jury misconduct. In 2007, appellant Martin filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he received incompetent and ineffective assistance at trial, and the court violated his right to be present when the jury requested to meet with the victim’s family. The district court summarily denied him this motion. The court decides that Martin failed to raise his objections at the time of his direct appeal, no explanation is given to why he failed to do so. Martin also failed to show facts that would entitle him to relief. The court affirms the earlier district court’s ruling. Martin vs. State of &lt;st1:state st="on"&gt;Minnesota&lt;/st1:state&gt; (&lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;Carlton County&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:state st="on"&gt;MN&lt;/st1:state&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt; supreme court)&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/supct/0805/OPA072150-0508.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2008/05/criminal-appeal.html' title='Criminal Appeal'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/724709683953316967'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/724709683953316967'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-8354213196805589115</id><published>2007-03-07T13:11:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2007-03-07T13:12:42.572-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='insurance'/><title type='text'>Insurance</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0702/opa060759-0227.htm"&gt;Insurance&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The family-owned-vehicle exclusion in the family vehicle policy is unenforceable when an individual, who owns and is operating a vehicle that is insured by his employer, is injured in a motor-vehicle accident with an uninsured driver, Minn. Stat. sec. 65B.49, subd. 3a(7) (2006), does not bar the individual from recovering excess uninsured-motorist benefits from an insurer that provides coverage on a different family vehicle.  &lt;br /&gt;Stewart v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. (Minn.Ct.App)</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2007/03/insurance.html' title='Insurance'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/8354213196805589115'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/8354213196805589115'/><author><name>Meshbesher &amp; Spence</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/08011423143401130604</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-8516153436319100821</id><published>2007-02-08T22:24:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2007-02-08T22:25:21.399-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='negligence'/><title type='text'>Negligence</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0701/opa060457-0102.htm"&gt;Negligence&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Where plaintiff was on his father-in-law's property and was participating in a project directed by his father-in-law; father-in-law told his sons and sons-in-law what to do, made the decision of where they would place debris being removed from a loft, and positioned a tractor's bucket beside the loft; plaintiff fell from the loft while he and another son-in-law were trying to throw an automobile axle into the bucket; and father-in-law directed the two men to "just throw it in there" because he could not "get [the bucket] ... any better than that"; we conclude that the record supports the jury's determination that plaintiff may recover from his father-in-law in negligence because father-in-law should have anticipated the harm despite the obviousness of the danger to plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;Davis v. Walter (Mower County) A06-457</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2007/02/negligence.html' title='Negligence'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/8516153436319100821'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/8516153436319100821'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-7811352929132723024</id><published>2007-02-08T22:23:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2007-02-08T22:25:04.688-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='driving conduct'/><title type='text'>Driving Conduct</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0701/opa060240-0102.htm"&gt;Driving Conduct&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Where a driver ran a red light and collided with a vehicle; and the driver testified that he sneezed several times as he approached the intersection, that when he stopped sneezing he was blinded by the sun, that he was aware of the upcoming intersection during the sneezing episode, and that he decided not to brake or take his foot off the accelerator; the Court concluded it was error to instruct the jury on the emergency rule because none of the Minnesota cases dealing with the emergency rule have involved sneezing or a comparable physical problem, and the evidence does not support a conclusion that sneezing deprived the driver of time for thought or the opportunity to weigh alternative courses of action or required him to act speedily by impulse or instinct.&lt;br /&gt;Barnes v. Dees (Hennepin County) A06-240</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2007/02/driving-conduct.html' title='Driving Conduct'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/7811352929132723024'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/7811352929132723024'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-6401211464500786122</id><published>2007-02-08T22:21:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2007-02-08T22:24:36.120-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='slip and fall'/><title type='text'>Slip and Fall</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0701/opa060550-0109.htm"&gt;Slip and Fall&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Even though abutting property owners attempted to remove snow and ice accumulation on the sidewalk, they are not liable for plaintiff's injuries which he sustained when he fell on the city-owned portion of the sidewalk.  While record photographs show that a pool of water had accumulated at the end of the driveway on the date of appellant's fall due to a mid-winter thaw, and the record also suggests that ice had melted from the snow banks on the sides of the driveway, which had been created, at least in part, by respondents' snow and ice removal activities, the existence of these conditions is typical during the course of a Minnesota winter, and does not constitute evidence of an artificial or dangerous condition.&lt;br /&gt;Byrne v. Kropp (Olmsted County) A06-550&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0612/opa060196-1219.htm"&gt;Slip and Fall&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Where, after a 12-14 inch snowfall, city employees plowed the snow on a sidewalk, used a sidewalk sweeper, and then applied sand, salt, or calcium chloride to any icy patches that remained; and about seven hours later, plaintiff fell on a sidewalk she described as wet, sloppy, and slushy; the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the city because the city owed no duty to plaintiff under the mere slipperiness doctrine.&lt;br /&gt;Juran v. City of White Bear Lake (Ramsey County) A06-196</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2007/02/slip-and-fall.html' title='Slip and Fall'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/6401211464500786122'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/6401211464500786122'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-115506285034381126</id><published>2006-08-08T14:47:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-08-08T14:47:30.343-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='statutes of limitation'/><title type='text'>Statutes of Limitation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0501/opa040901-0111.htm"&gt;Statutes of Limitation&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An object need not be completely installed in order to qualify as an “improvement to real property” under Minn. Stat. sec. 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2004).  Negligence during the installation process can lead to the “defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property” under section 541.051.  When an portion of an improvement to real property was not installed correctly and presented a safety hazard at the time of plaintiff’s alleged injuries, it was defective and unsafe condition within the meaning of section 541.051.  While it may not be necessary to show proximate cause between a defective and unsafe condition and an injury in order to show the injury arose out of the defective and unsafe condition within the meaning of section 541.051, such a causal connection is sufficient to meet the requirements of section 541.051.&lt;br /&gt;Lietz v. Northern States Power Co. (Court of Appeals)(unpublished)</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/08/statutes-of-limitation.html' title='Statutes of Limitation'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/115506285034381126'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/115506285034381126'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-115506282182674581</id><published>2006-08-08T14:46:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-08-08T14:47:01.836-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='medical malpractice'/><title type='text'>Medical Malpractice</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0607/opa051698-0725.htm"&gt;Medical Malpractice&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Minnesota does not recognize a common-law cause of action for negligent credentialing or privileging of a physician against a hospital or other review organization.  Minn. Stat. sec. 145.63-.64 do not explicitly grant immunity to a hospital or other review organization from liability for a claim of negligent credentialing or privileging of a physician. But the statutes limit liability to actions or recommendations not made in the reasonable belief that the action or recommendation is warranted by facts known to the review organization after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts on which the review organization’s action or recommendation is made and limit evidence to support or defend against such claims to information available from original sources.&lt;br /&gt;Larson v. Wasemiller (Wilkin County) A05-1698, A05-1701</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/08/medical-malpractice.html' title='Medical Malpractice'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/115506282182674581'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/115506282182674581'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-115168621888551328</id><published>2006-06-30T12:49:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-06-30T12:50:18.896-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='slip and fall'/><title type='text'>Slip and Fall</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0606/opa052356-0620.htm"&gt;Slip and Fall&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Where a tenant left her apartment building for about an hour; when she returned, she fell down a stairway; and the tenant has not presented evidence of an accumulation of water at the top of the stairs when she left the apartment building or when she returned; we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment because the tenant failed to present sufficient evidence that her slip and fall was caused by an accumulation of water at the top of the stairs directly caused by defendants or that defendants had constructive notice of water accumulating at the top of the stairs.&lt;br /&gt;Frye v. Huntington Point Apartment Building (Hennepin County) A05-2356</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/06/slip-and-fall.html' title='Slip and Fall'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/115168621888551328'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/115168621888551328'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114205797378643375</id><published>2006-03-11T02:19:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-11T02:19:33.786-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='car accident'/><title type='text'>Car Accident</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0601/opa050874-0117.htm"&gt;Car Accident&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Individual was an “occupant” of a motor vehicle for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage when she was crushed between two cars as she was loading objects into the back of a vehicle and the upper half of her body had just been inside the vehicle mere moments before the impact.  Although the insured vehicle is not the direct cause of injury, the injuries are not so far removed from the use of that vehicle, when its bumpers directly contributed to the injuries sustained, to deny underinsured motorist coverage on that vehicle. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Marvin (Washington County).   A05-874.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/car-accident_11.html' title='Car Accident'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205797378643375'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205797378643375'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114205795057291382</id><published>2006-03-11T02:18:00.001-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-11T02:19:10.573-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='dog bite'/><title type='text'>Dog Bite</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0601/opa050192-0110.htm"&gt;Dog Bite&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Where the evidence showed that an 11-year-old continued to tease the dog with the dog’s toy after being asked not to and after being warned that the dog was “offensive” about his toys, the issue of provocation was a fact issue properly submitted to the jury.Ward v. Freiderich (Dakota County).  A05-192.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0601/opa042420-0124.htm"&gt;Dog Bite&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Child and her parents lived in a mobile home park and the child was bit by a dog owned by the brother of another of the park’s tenants.   The Goodhue County District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment for the landlord on the parents’ common-law negligence claim because, as a landlord, the park had no duty to control the dog which was within the confines of the tenant’s lot, and the parents failed to demonstrate that the dog had a vicious propensity that would have put the park on notice of the dog’s character and the resulting foreseeable risk. Burger v. Bigelow’s Ponderosa Mobile Home Park.  A04-2420.&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/dog-bite_11.html' title='Dog Bite'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205795057291382'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205795057291382'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114205790567487872</id><published>2006-03-11T02:18:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-11T02:18:25.676-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='workers compensation'/><title type='text'>Workmen’s Compensation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0412/opa040709-1228.htm"&gt;Workmen’s Compensation&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;The 2000 amendments to Minn. Stat. sec. 176.061 (2004) did not modify the right of an employer to make a claim for reimbursement of benefits from a third-party tortfeasor; an employer’s right of recovery remains a right of subrogation and the employer’s right of recovery is no greater than that of the employee. Where an employer has paid benefits to the spouse of a deceased employee, the employer’s recovery from a third-party tortfeasor is measured by the damages recoverable by the employee’s heirs and next of kin under the wrongful death statute. Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Bjelland (Court of Appeals).  A04-709.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/workmens-compensation.html' title='Workmen’s Compensation'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205790567487872'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205790567487872'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114205786910150451</id><published>2006-03-11T02:17:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-11T02:17:49.103-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='slip and fall'/><title type='text'>Slip and Fall</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0602/opa050483-0214.htm"&gt;Slip and Fall&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Plaintiff sustained injuries when the rubber tip of her right crutch slipped out from under her in the entryway of a restaurant.  Plaintiff produced no evidence to contradict the restaurant manager’s testimony about use of applicable floor cleaning procedures and no evidence that the restaurant caused the floor mat to be placed improperly.  District Court did not err in entering summary judgment dismissing the negligence claim because the evidence does not support the claims that the restaurant created a dangerous condition or had actual or constructive knowledge of such a condition. Spaude v. Chili’s of Minnesota, Inc., d/b/a Romano’s Macaroni Grill (Hennepin County)(unpublished). A05-483.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0601/opa050863-0110.htm"&gt;Slip and Fall&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Where a bookstore customer slipped and fell on ice on the public sidewalk as she left the bookstore and witnesses could only speculate that the ice was caused by water melting off the building or awning, summary judgment on the issue of the owner/occupants’ duty to the customer based on an artificial condition was appropriate.  There is insufficient evidence to show that the ice was caused by an artificial condition attributable to the abutting owner/occupants. Jones v. Evenstar Book Store, Inc. (Hennepin County).  A05-863.&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/slip-and-fall.html' title='Slip and Fall'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205786910150451'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205786910150451'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114205781314271620</id><published>2006-03-11T02:16:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-11T02:16:53.153-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='homeowner liability'/><title type='text'>Homeowner Liability</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0602/opa050578-0221.htm"&gt;Homeowner Liability&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Plaintiff entered an office building’s parking lot, which was posted with no-trespassing signs; and as plaintiff ran, he fell off the ledge of a downward-sloping driveway leading to an underground loading dock.  District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s negligence claim on the basis that plaintiff was a trespasser and the record lacks evidence that the property owner should have known of constant intrusions in the driveway area, that the ledge of the driveway was a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, or that the property owner had reason to believe trespassers would not discover the condition.  Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is also barred by the ten-year statute of repose in Minn. Stat. sec. 541.051, subd. 1(a). Jackson v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. (Hennepin County)(unpublished).  A05-578.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/homeowner-liability.html' title='Homeowner Liability'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205781314271620'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114205781314271620'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114185347354232710</id><published>2006-03-08T17:30:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-08T17:31:13.553-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='wrongful death'/><title type='text'>Wrongful Death</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0601/opa051122-0131.htm"&gt;Wrongful Death&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Lack of any particular acts of service between biological father and son in the years preceding son's death supported district court determination that father sustained no pecuniary loss after son died, precluding distribution of wrongful death settlement proceeds to father, despite father's contention that son's mother prevented him from having a significant relationship with son, but that he expected to have such a relationship in the future.Ellingson v. Barber (Court of Appeals)(unpublished) A05-1122.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/wrongful-death.html' title='Wrongful Death'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114185347354232710'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114185347354232710'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114185268035509811</id><published>2006-03-08T17:17:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-08T17:18:00.356-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='dog bite'/><title type='text'>Dog Bite</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0504/opa040804-0426.htm"&gt;Dog Bite&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A dog groomer, who voluntarily accepts temporary responsibility for care of a dog and exhibits basic attributes of ownership, is the keeper of the dog for purposes of secondary ownership under Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004), the dog-bite statute.Carlson v. Friday, 694 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.Ct.App.2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/supct/0502/opa031707-0210.htm"&gt;Dog Bite&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The dog owner liability provisions of Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004) apply to municipal owners of police dogs. The authorization to use reasonable force in Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(1) (2004), applies where the force is directed toward an arrestee but unintentionally causes harm to an innocent bystander or where the force is directed toward a third person who is or reasonably appears to be impeding a lawful arrest. To the extent that the dog owner liability provisions of section 347.22 conflict with the authorization for police officers to use reasonable force under section 609.06, subdivision 1(1), the authorization to use reasonable force prevails because it is more specific and more recently enacted.Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dept., 691 N.W.2d 824 (Minn.2005).</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/dog-bite.html' title='Dog Bite'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114185268035509811'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114185268035509811'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114185262510839095</id><published>2006-03-08T17:16:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-03-08T17:17:05.116-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='car accident'/><title type='text'>Car Accident</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctapun/0501/opa041050-0118.htm"&gt;Car Accident&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;When a municipality has adopted a police vehicular pursuit policy setting forth the specific conduct required of officers, the officers do not have discretion to ignore the policy and are not entitled to official immunity for their actions that do not conform to the policy. Thompson v. City of Minneapolis (Court of Appeals), A04-1050.&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/03/car-accident.html' title='Car Accident'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114185262510839095'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114185262510839095'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114055615011843047</id><published>2006-02-21T17:08:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-02-21T17:09:10.123-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='homeowner liability'/><title type='text'>Homeowner Liability</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0401/opa030629-0113.htm"&gt;Olmanson v. Le Sueur County&lt;/a&gt;, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;            As a statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2002), provides that no action may accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction in question.  But subdivision 1(c) of the statute exempts actions for negligent maintenance, operation, and inspection.  Thus, an action for failure to warn of a dangerous condition on a property-owner’s land is not time-barred by subdivision 1(a).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0401/opa030370-0113.htm"&gt;Taney v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624,&lt;/a&gt; 673 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;      In a negligence action, the substantial remodeling of real property in the direct vicinity of an accident constitutes an improvement to that property and therefore the statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, runs from the date of that remodeling rather than the date of original construction of the real property.&lt;br /&gt;           In a negligence action, so long as the jury instructions are a fair and correct statement of the law, the district court does not err when it refuses to issue an instruction that the jury may not consider violations of the Uniform Building Code in determining negligence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0310/opa030314-1007.htm"&gt;Bundy v. Holmquist&lt;/a&gt;, 669 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. App. 2003).&lt;br /&gt;            Premises liability is not limited to owners and possessors of real estate and those acting on their behalf but extends to any person who creates an unreasonable risk of harm that results in injury.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/02/homeowner-liability.html' title='Homeowner Liability'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055615011843047'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055615011843047'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114055609152127562</id><published>2006-02-21T17:07:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-02-21T17:08:11.523-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='commercial trucking'/><title type='text'>Commercial Trucking</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0406/opa031557-0608.htm"&gt;Oldakowski v. M.P. Barrett Trucking, Inc.&lt;/a&gt;, 680 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;            The liability of a carrier who leases equipment for the conduct of its owner/operator extends to the negligence of the owner/operator in operating the equipment or in other conduct within the scope of the agreement to provide hauling services.  Genuine fact issues on the scope of the agreement must be resolved in trial proceedings.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/02/commercial-trucking.html' title='Commercial Trucking'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055609152127562'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055609152127562'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114055603941147196</id><published>2006-02-21T17:06:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-02-21T17:07:19.413-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='medical malpractice'/><title type='text'>Medical Malpractice</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0502/opa040825-0215.htm"&gt;Middle River-Snake River Watershed Dist. v. Dennis Drewes, Inc.&lt;/a&gt;, 692 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. App. 2005).&lt;br /&gt;            A party who, without good cause, fails to serve a necessary expert-identification affidavit within 180 days after initiation of a negligence claim against a professional cannot benefit from the statutory 60-day period available to cure postdemand deficiencies under Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6(c) (2004); Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subds. 2(2), 4, and Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6(c) (2004), read together, mandate dismissal of the claim.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0403/opa030915-0316.htm"&gt;Maudsley v. Pederson&lt;/a&gt;, 676 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. App. 2004).&lt;br /&gt;            Minn. Stat. § 145.682 (2002) encourages parties to bring motions to dismiss medical-malpractice actions early in the proceedings, either to eliminate frivolous lawsuits or to give plaintiffs an opportunity to cure any defects prior to trial.  Thus, to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s expert affidavit, the defendant should file a timely motion to dismiss pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6 (2002).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0408/opa031636-0817.htm"&gt;McDonough v. Allina Health Sys.&lt;/a&gt;, 685 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. App. 2004).&lt;br /&gt;            The district court did not err in excluding expert testimony as not generally accepted in the applicable medical or scientific community when appellants did not demonstrate that physicians, neurologists, or scientists generally accept the theory that high infusion rates of immunoglobulin cause strokes.&lt;br /&gt;            The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony as unreliable when the experts did not eliminate other potential causes of the stroke or otherwise demonstrate the reliability of their opinions that a high infusion rate of immunoglobulin caused a stroke.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/02/medical-malpractice.html' title='Medical Malpractice'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055603941147196'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055603941147196'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22797347.post-114055597755427787</id><published>2006-02-21T17:05:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2006-02-21T17:06:17.556-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='workers compensation'/><title type='text'>Workers Compensation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0409/opa031635-0921.htm"&gt;Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC&lt;/a&gt;, 686 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. App. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 2005 WL 3071592 (Minn. 2005).&lt;br /&gt;When an employee undertakes direct action to assist a co-employee with a workplace injury, that employee acquires a personal duty to exercise proper care.&lt;br /&gt;            When a co-employee has a personal duty to exercise proper care in the treatment of a workplace injury and provides more than scant care that does not entirely disregard the consequences of the injury, the co-employee is entitled to summary judgment in an action for gross negligence under the workers’ compensation act.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0412/opa040709-1228.htm"&gt;Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland&lt;/a&gt;, (A04-709) 690 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (Minn. Mar. 4, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;An alleged third-party tortfeasor in a workers’ compensation subrogation action has a right to a jury trial on both damages and liability, and the insurer-subrogee is not automatically entitled to the full recovery of benefits paid and payable without first proving damages and liability.&lt;br /&gt;            The plain meaning of the amended language of Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subds. 3, 5, 7, 10 (2002), permits an insurer-subrogee full recovery of workers’ compensation benefits paid and payable, regardless of common law or statutory limits.</content><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/2006/02/workers-compensation.html' title='Workers Compensation'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.meshbesher.com/blog.xml' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055597755427787'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/22797347/posts/default/114055597755427787'/><author><name>MLT Group</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/17438690520065532039</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email></author></entry></feed>