Homeowner Liability

Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004).
As a statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2002), provides that no action may accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction in question. But subdivision 1(c) of the statute exempts actions for negligent maintenance, operation, and inspection. Thus, an action for failure to warn of a dangerous condition on a property-owner’s land is not time-barred by subdivision 1(a).

Taney v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624, 673 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004).
In a negligence action, the substantial remodeling of real property in the direct vicinity of an accident constitutes an improvement to that property and therefore the statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, runs from the date of that remodeling rather than the date of original construction of the real property.
In a negligence action, so long as the jury instructions are a fair and correct statement of the law, the district court does not err when it refuses to issue an instruction that the jury may not consider violations of the Uniform Building Code in determining negligence.

Bundy v. Holmquist, 669 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. App. 2003).
Premises liability is not limited to owners and possessors of real estate and those acting on their behalf but extends to any person who creates an unreasonable risk of harm that results in injury.

Commercial Trucking

Oldakowski v. M.P. Barrett Trucking, Inc., 680 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004).
The liability of a carrier who leases equipment for the conduct of its owner/operator extends to the negligence of the owner/operator in operating the equipment or in other conduct within the scope of the agreement to provide hauling services. Genuine fact issues on the scope of the agreement must be resolved in trial proceedings.

Medical Malpractice

Middle River-Snake River Watershed Dist. v. Dennis Drewes, Inc., 692 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. App. 2005).
A party who, without good cause, fails to serve a necessary expert-identification affidavit within 180 days after initiation of a negligence claim against a professional cannot benefit from the statutory 60-day period available to cure postdemand deficiencies under Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6(c) (2004); Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subds. 2(2), 4, and Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6(c) (2004), read together, mandate dismissal of the claim.

Maudsley v. Pederson, 676 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. App. 2004).
Minn. Stat. § 145.682 (2002) encourages parties to bring motions to dismiss medical-malpractice actions early in the proceedings, either to eliminate frivolous lawsuits or to give plaintiffs an opportunity to cure any defects prior to trial. Thus, to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s expert affidavit, the defendant should file a timely motion to dismiss pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6 (2002).

McDonough v. Allina Health Sys., 685 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. App. 2004).
The district court did not err in excluding expert testimony as not generally accepted in the applicable medical or scientific community when appellants did not demonstrate that physicians, neurologists, or scientists generally accept the theory that high infusion rates of immunoglobulin cause strokes.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony as unreliable when the experts did not eliminate other potential causes of the stroke or otherwise demonstrate the reliability of their opinions that a high infusion rate of immunoglobulin caused a stroke.

Workers Compensation

Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. App. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 2005 WL 3071592 (Minn. 2005).
When an employee undertakes direct action to assist a co-employee with a workplace injury, that employee acquires a personal duty to exercise proper care.
When a co-employee has a personal duty to exercise proper care in the treatment of a workplace injury and provides more than scant care that does not entirely disregard the consequences of the injury, the co-employee is entitled to summary judgment in an action for gross negligence under the workers’ compensation act.

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, (A04-709) 690 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (Minn. Mar. 4, 2005).
An alleged third-party tortfeasor in a workers’ compensation subrogation action has a right to a jury trial on both damages and liability, and the insurer-subrogee is not automatically entitled to the full recovery of benefits paid and payable without first proving damages and liability.
The plain meaning of the amended language of Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subds. 3, 5, 7, 10 (2002), permits an insurer-subrogee full recovery of workers’ compensation benefits paid and payable, regardless of common law or statutory limits.

Car Accidents

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Great West Cas., 695 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005).
If an insured is injured in an accident involving a stalled vehicle loaded on top of an automobile-transport trailer, the injury resulted from the “maintenance or use” of the stalled vehicle, and the insurer of the stalled vehicle is responsible for payment of no-fault insurance benefits to the insured under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 3 (2000).

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Forstrom, 669 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. App. 2003), aff’d , 684 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. 2004).
Extrinsic evidence may be introduced to rebut the presumption of vehicle ownership that is established by the certificate of title only to avoid vicarious liability or to avoid responsibility under the no-fault act.

Dougherty v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 683 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (Minn. Oct. 19, 2004).
When examining whether an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle, the no-fault act’s disregard of driver fault precludes the courts from treating prior drinking as an act of independent significance that breaks causation between vehicle use and an injury.
The natural and reasonable consequences of using a motor vehicle necessarily extend to the driver’s efforts to respond to weather-related emergency circumstances.

Entzion v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 675 N.W.2d 925 (Minn. App. 2004).
The six-year statute of limitations governing contract actions applies to an insured’s action against an insurer for no-fault benefits.
The statute of limitations begins to run on an action for no-fault benefits when the cause of action accrues.